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I.
Abstract
The Food and Drug Administration never has been and never will be completely insulated from politics;
it exists and operates as an integral part of the federal government in Washington, DC, not in a vacuum.
Nevertheless, the FDA Commissioner has become a more political entity since 1988, the year in which
Congress made the position subject to Senate conﬁrmation. Whether considered beneﬁcial or adverse, this
politicization of FDA deserves examination—from the two decades preceding the 1988 Act, to the motivation




The Food and Drug Administration, an agency which today monitors $1 trillion worth of products that
account for 25 cents of every consumer retail sales dollar spent,1 can trace its genesis back to 1839, when
Congress appropriated $1000 to the Commissioner of Patents for “the collection of agricultural statistics,
and for other agricultural purposes.”2 From the Patent Oﬃce in the State Department, FDA shifted to the
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and then to the Federal Security Agency, before settling in 1953 in the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)—which in 1979 became the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), and where FDA has resided ever since.3
Despite its extensive and rich institutional history, it was not until 1988—nearly 150 years after the initial
congressional appropriation to the Patent Oﬃce—that FDA was formally created by statute.4 In passing the
Food and Drug Administration Act (1988 Act), codiﬁed as Section 903(b)(1) of the Food Drug & Cosmetic
1Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 17 (1991); “History of FDA,” on FDA
website, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/fulltext.html (last updated January 21, 2003).
2Peter Barton Hutt, Symposium on the History of Fifty Years of Food Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act: A Historical Introduction, 45 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 17 (1990) (quoting 5 Stat. 353, 354 (1839)).
3FDA took its current name in 1930. Hutt, Symposium at 18; “Designation and Location of FDA in Federal Government,”
on FDA website, available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/designat.html (last updated October 15, 2001).
4Before 1988, FDA and its predecessor organizations were all created by administrative action. Peter Barton Hutt, Investi-
gations and Reports on the Food and Drug Administration, in Richard M. Cooper (ed.), Food and Drug Law 41 (1991).
2Act (FD&C Act), Congress established FDA as an agency of HHS; with a Commissioner of Food and Drugs
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; and laid out the Commissioner’s
general powers and responsibilities.5The FDA Commissioner’s organizational rank is Executive Level IV,
three levels below the HHS Secretary and on the same tier as the Assistant Secretaries of HHS.6 The FDA
Commissioner serves at the pleasure of the President, who can remove the Commissioner from oﬃce for any
or no reason.7 Prior to 1988, FDA Commissioners were appointed by the Secretary of HHS and thus not
subject to Senate conﬁrmation.8
Passage of the 1988 Act apparently met with little more than mild, ﬂeeting interest. As the Washington Post
reported at the time: “Relatively few people took notice last week when a bill to make the commissioner
of the Food and Drug Administration subject to conﬁrmation sailed through the Senate.”9 That perhaps
the 1988 Act was simply a case of form catching up to function might help explain the reaction. Today,
however, 15 years after its passage, it is apparent that the 1988 Act has had some profound consequences on
5102 Stat. 3048, 3120-22 (1988). The FDA Act of 1988 (21 U.S.C.A. § 393) provides in relevant part:
§ 393. Food and Drug Administration (Current through P.L. 108-6, approved 02-13-03)
(a) In general
There is established in the Department of Health and Human Services the Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter in this
section referred to as the “Administration”)....
(d) Commissioner
(1) Appointment
There shall be in the Administration a Commissioner of Food and Drugs (hereinafter in this section referred to as the “Com-
missioner”) who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) General powers
The Secretary, through the Commissioner, shall be responsible for executing this chapter and for—
(A) providing overall direction to the Food and Drug Administration and establishing and implementing general policies
respecting the management and operation of programs and activities of the Food and Drug Administration;
(B) coordinating and overseeing the operation of all administrative entities within the Administration;
(C) research relating to foods, drugs, cosmetics, and devices in carrying out this chapter;
(D) conducting educational and public information programs relating to the responsibilities of the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration; and
(E) performing such other functions as the Secretary may prescribe.
65 U.S.C.A. § 5315. In re Kessler, 100 F.3d 1015, 1017 (DC Cir. 1996) (“Dr. Kessler’s actual rank...is a Level IV: the same
grade as the typical assistant secretary of a department or a member of a Commission (Executive Level IV is the journeyman
level of those appointed by the President and conﬁrmed by the Senate).”)
7Hutt & Merrill at 16.
8The Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, requires Senate conﬁrmation of oﬃcers appointed by the
President.
9Michael Specter, New Freedom for FDA Commissioner?, Washington Post, Feb. 9, 1988, at A21.
3the post of FDA Commissioner—and, more generally, on FDA itself. Although it carved out an autonomous
identity for the FDA Commissioner in the 1988 Act, Congress necessarily and oﬃcially injected a certain
dose of politics into FDA, the level of which has ﬂuctuated over time. The result is a Catch-22: Although
Congress sought to grant it independence in the 1988 Act, FDA arguably has become more politicized since
that time—as viewed primarily through the FDA Commissioner appointment process.
II.
Structure and Operation of FDA
FDA is located within the Executive Branch and it operates within HHS; the 1988 Act neither gave FDA
statutory authority separate from HHS nor made it an independent regulatory agency.10 The FD&C Act
vests authority in the HHS Secretary, who in turn delegates it (through the Assistant Secretary for Health)
to the FDA Commissioner.11 The Commissioner heads FDA and is assisted by a number of deputy com-
missioners in carrying out agency business.12 Also integral to eﬀective operation of the agency is the chief
counsel for FDA, who, although oﬃcially an employee of HHS, “carries tremendous internal political weight”
as the Commissioner’s lawyer.13
10James T. O’Reilly, Food and Drug Administration (2nd ed.) 2-4 (1993).
11O’Reilly at 2-2. The substantive contents of the FD&C Act, although of course signiﬁcant, will be addressed only as they
pertain to the subject matter of this paper—in order to maintain a properly manageable scope.
12The positions are Deputy Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner for Policy, Deputy Commissioner for External Aﬀairs,
Deputy Commissioner for Operations, and Deputy Commissioner for Management and Systems. “Deputy Commissioners
and Their Predecessors,” on FDA website, available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/depcomm.html (last updated
February 26, 2002).
The FDA Commissioner may, with HHS approval, reshuﬄe the agency organizational structure. O’Reilly at 2-6.
13O’Reilly at 2-6; Hutt & Merrill at 17. Alexander Schmidt, the late former FDA Commissioner, once remarked: “Perhaps
my favorite nonconsumer question is the one that the reporter always asks when he wants to show me he’s really got inside
dope: ‘Mr. Commissioner,’ he asks, ‘who really runs FDA—you or Peter Hutt?”’ Twenty Questions for the Commissioner, 29
4In practice, the HHS Secretary has given nearly complete authority on FDA matters to the Commissioner—
indicative of the “considerable decisional independence” with which FDA has operated for most of its ex-
istence.14 Understandably, FDA Commissioner is widely considered among the most prominent posts in
government and thus has drawn ﬁttingly prominent individuals to the job. Indeed, wrote Peter Barton Hutt
and Richard Merrill, “FDA’s visibility and the potential sensitivity of its decisions always have given the
Commissioner a direct line to the Secretary of HHS and, sometimes, to the White House as well.”15
Over time, FDA has endured the tip of a double-edged sword with regard to carrying out its mission. FDA
continually receives high marks from the public; polls show that more than two-thirds (67%) of Americans
have a positive view of FDA.16 Yet FDA is also among the most scrutinized agencies in Washington: In fact,
during the last few decades, FDA “has become perhaps the most thoroughly analyzed government agency
in history.”17 The primary channel for most of the recent criticism of FDA, whether warranted or not, has
been congressional hearings. As one author has observed: “The Commissioner of the FDA is a favorite wit-
ness because the FDA’s requirements are controversial; its mistakes can have enormous and life-threatening
eﬀects in some cases, and its policies and practices are in any event a ﬁrst-class media event for newspeople
covering Congress.”18 Also signiﬁcant is the fact that FDA relies on the support of Congress for funding
suﬃcient to maintain its programs and to fulﬁll its agenda.
It is against this backdrop that the 1988 Act and its eﬀects on appointment of the FDA Commissioner—as
well as FDA generally—must be viewed. The politicization of FDA over the past 15 years, although brief,
Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 596, 600 (1974).
14Hutt & Merrill at 16. See also O’Reilly at 2-3.
15Hutt & Merrill at 15.
16The Harris Poll #51, October 17, 2001, on Harris Interactive website, available at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris poll/printerfriend.asp?PID=262. In 2000, Harris Poll #62 (October 18,
2000) reported that 62% of Americans viewed FDA favorably.
But see the metaphorical observation of a former FDA Commissioner: “[T]he FDA is somewhat like a referee in a football
game. While most people cheer loudly for the home team, and a few even cheer for the visiting team, nobody ever cheers for
the referee. And yet, like the referee, the FDA often has to make the diﬃcult calls—and without the beneﬁt of an instant
replay.” Frank E. Young, For Every Thing There is a Season, 45 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 7, 15 (1990).
17Hutt, Investigations and Reports at 41.
18O’Reilly at 2-14.
5has grown quite intense at times.
III.
Politics & FDA Before the 1988 Act
During the 1970s, FDA received an extraordinary amount of congressional attention, perhaps more than any
other regulatory agency.19 That decade was punctuated by hearings conducted by Senator Edward Kennedy
(D-Mass.) to investigate charges by FDA employees that “FDA was dominated by the pharmaceutical in-
dustry and was inadequately protecting the public against unsafe and ineﬀective new human and animal
drugs.”20 Even though the allegations proved largely unsubstantiated, after an internal investigation and
an investigation by a review panel appointed by the HEW Secretary, the hearings produced somewhat of a
political maelstrom. In the aftermath of the hearings, Kennedy proposed subdividing FDA into a Drugs and
Devices Administration and a Food and Cosmetics Administration; the proposals were intended to elevate
the Commissionership to a Senate-conﬁrmed oﬃce with statutory powers over the statutorily established
FDA within HEW.21
Although it never materialized, the subdivision proposal foreshadowed, to some extent, the ultimate modi-
ﬁcation of FDA in 1988. It also illustrated just how tightly the political vise can grip FDA and how acutely
that grip is felt within the agency. As then- Commissioner Alexander Schmidt remarked, at the time, about
his decision to make public certain materials related to his own investigation of charges made at the Kennedy
hearings:
19Hutt & Merrill at 19 (noting that between 1971 and 1977, FDA oﬃcials were called to testify before congressional committees
198 times).
20Hutt, Investigations and Reports at 49.
21O’Reilly at 2-2.
6I have been criticized recently by friends inside and outside FDA for taking steps that, and I quote,
‘play into our critics hands,’ or ‘make me appear weak.’...I have said that FDA needs and welcomes
constructive criticism; that the Kennedy hearings have served to spotlight certain errors in our drug
approval process; and that FDA will be better and stronger because of the hearings.22
The competing pressures are understandable, given that FDA is entrusted to ensure the safety of food, drugs,
cosmetics and medical devices for the entire nation. Attempting to carry out this momentous task within
such a political climate makes it even more diﬃcult—a lesson FDA Commissioners have learned all too well
over the years.
The recollections of former FDA Commissioners provide perhaps the best illumination into the intimate
and sometimes prickly relationship between the agency and politics. This examination will begin with a
few Commissioners who served prior to 1988, before the top position required Presidential appointment and
Senate conﬁrmation. The experiences of these Commissioners will help place in proper historical context the
1988 Act and its aftermath.
The FDA Commissioner simply cannot divorce himself from politics; to do so would ignore the reality in
which he and the agency operate.23 As Charles Edwards, who served as FDA Commissioner from 1969 to
1973, explained: “To try to take politics out of FDA, ﬁrst of all will not happen, and second, should not
happen. Politics basically are good if handled properly because politics reﬂects the views of various people
in society.”24 During his tenure, Edwards steered FDA through a period of turmoil on numerous fronts.
For example, FDA was assigned responsibility for regulating biologics and radiological health; there were
also massive recalls of cancer-linked cyclamates, botulism-suspected Bon Vivant vichyssoise, and mercury-
tainted swordﬁsh and tuna.25 “It became very obvious,” Edwards recognized, “that if we were going to
survive as a meaningful entity, then we knew we had to reach out to Congress.”26 To that end, Edwards
23If I use such a phrase as “himself” or “he,” I also intend it to refer to “herself” or “she” in the alternative; I have omitted
the alternative in the text simply for stylistic purposes.
24Interview with author, March 22, 2003.
25“FDA Commissioners and Their Predecessors,” on FDA website, available at
http://www.fda.gov.opacom/morechoices/comm1.html (last updated November 20, 2002).
26Interview with author.
7said he made it an immediate priority to establish a good relationship with Congress.27 The position of
FDA Commissioner, in Edwards’ view, requires a certain degree of equanimity and versatility: “If you have
a strong Commissioner and a Commissioner that is truly running FDA, then he has to have the ability to
understand both the science of what he is talking about and the political ramiﬁcations of the decision he is
about to make.... The key is not to be whipsawed by the science or the politics of it.”28 Upon reﬂection,
although he received input from other sources, such as the White House, Edwards believes—and is proud of
the fact—that he and his staﬀ were able to run FDA basically free from interference.29
Alexander Schmidt, who succeeded Edwards and served as Commissioner from 1973 to 1976, considered his
professional background both a curse and a blessing. Prior to becoming FDA Commissioner, Schmidt had
served as dean and a professor at the University of Illinois College of Medicine in Chicago. He acknowledged
candidly: “[U]nless you are an old Washington hand, you go into [the job] quite na¨ ıve and you don’t know
things you should know. My maturing took a huge step a few weeks after that ﬁrst Kennedy hearing. I
didn’t know what in the hell was going on or what in the hell was happening to me.”30 Nevertheless,
Schmidt believed that his professional experiences made him an attractive candidate for the job. “[T]he
Nixon administration wanted a certain kind of appointment,” Schmidt explained. “So, in a way, I think I
ﬁt what the administration was looking for, and that was a Republican person from the academic ﬁeld who
Edwards tells an interesting story about his assumption of oﬃce. After accepting the Nixon administration’s oﬀer to become
FDA Commissioner, Edwards had planned initially to serve as an assistant to HEW Secretary Robert Finch for a short while,
in order to get a sense of what was going on in FDA. But two days after he arrived in Washington, the newspapers leaked the
story that Edwards would become the new Commissioner—prompting the current Commissioner, Herbert Ley, to resign. Finch
then called Edwards and told him, “The job is yours.” Edwards went over to Ley’s oﬃce—the two men had never met—which
had a long conference table with piles of neatly stacked papers. Edwards recalled: “I asked him what were the major problems
of the agency. He pointed to the papers and said, ‘There they are.’ He tossed me a toy football and said, ‘The ball is in your
court.”’
27Interview with author. Edwards remains close friends with congressmen he worked with as Commissioner, such as retired
Rep. Paul Rogers (D-Fla.) and Sen. Edward Kennedy.
28Interview with author.
29Id.
30“FDA Oral History Program: Interview with Alexander M. Schmidt” (conducted March 8-9, 1985), on FDA website,
available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/schmidt/part4.html (created January 17, 2002).
8had some management skills and might be able to manage FDA.”31
Indeed, Schmidt’s experiences illustrate the important duty of FDA Commissioners to strike a delicate
balance between the proper degree of immersion in and insulation from politics. Schmidt was mindful of
the fact that FDA needed suﬃcient independence to function eﬀectively and that it was his job to ensure
this, a notion reinforced to him by professionals within the agency. Thus, he made a deal with then-HEW
Secretary Casper Weinberger: “I would keep Cap and the White House informed of anything they needed
to be or should be informed of so they wouldn’t be surprised and they wouldn’t get hit on the back of the
head with a wet ﬁsh or whatever, and I would run the agency well. And in return for that, they would leave
me alone.”32 The arrangement worked out swimmingly, in Schmidt’s estimation. He had ample authority
and discretion over FDA decisionmaking, and he still enjoyed solid support from Weinberger—for which, as
he admitted, he was particularly grateful during the Kennedy hearings. The simple but unmistakable lesson
here, in Schmidt’s words: “There is an advantage to being a member of the party in power.”33
But with the good comes the bad and, as FDA Commissioner, Schmidt also encountered the other edge of
the proverbial double-edged sword discussed above. He articulated the familiar frustration experienced by
many science- and medically-trained professionals within FDA: “[M]ost people who instigate the controversy
or ﬁght with FDA don’t understand science or what science is or the limitations of science or when science
leaves oﬀ and something else begins. That something else is really politics. The principal reason is that there
is not a rigorous diﬀerentiation of science and politics.”34 Eﬀecting such a diﬀerentiation, however, remains
a near-herculean task—and perhaps one that does not comport with the external realities that surround
FDA.35
31“Interview with Alexander M. Schmidt,” available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/schmidt/part2.html
(created January 17, 2002). Schmidt observed that, in this regard, the Reagan administration followed along the same track




35Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the American public considers scientists (51%) and doctors (50%) to be professions
of “very great” prestige—trouncing the perceived prestige of members of Congress (27%) and lawyers (15%). Scientists and
9Where Schmidt acutely felt the sting of politics as FDA Commissioner, his successor, Donald Kennedy, who
served from 1977 to 1979, actually tended to relish the give-and-take with Congress. “I was a Commissioner
who liked a political struggle, if I liked the objectives,” Kennedy explained, noting that he befriended
members of Congress from both parties. “I enjoyed jousting with Congress. Sometimes it was fun because
they made it fun.”36 Kennedy admitted, however, that he beneﬁted because his party, the Democrats,
controlled the White House and both chambers of Congress during his tenure as Commissioner: “It is much
harder when that is not the case—if you have a suﬃcient amount of insulation and inﬂuence, you can
accomplish a lot more.”37 Kennedy’s impact on FDA was unquestionably valuable in terms of rejuvenating
the agency and elevating its prestige in the public eye after a period of tumult, according to one author who
studied Kennedy closely. “By raising the tone of the FDA Kennedy improved its public image,” observed
Herbert Kaufman, noting Kennedy’s cordial relationship with Congress. “By reestablishing its good name,
he helped raise its tone. Indeed, the two elements are so closely related that they may be two sides of the
same coin.... In the FDA they rose, thanks in large measure to the administrative behavior of the chief.”38
Even Kennedy’s entrance into oﬃce was comfortable, setting the tone for his tenure. HHS Secretary Joseph
Califano held a swearing-in ceremony for him with a Bible, Kennedy recalled, “but this was really window-
dressing because I could have just walked into the job as Commissioner.”39 Kennedy also recognizes the other
doctors are the top two professions thought to have “very great” prestige. The Harris Poll #54, October 16, 2002, on Harris
Interactive website, available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris poll/printerfriend.asp?PID=333.
36Interview with author, March 20, 2003.
37Id.
38Herbert Kaufman, The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs 147 (1981). Kaufman elaborated on Kennedy:
“He treated his colleagues with respect, was receptive to their ideas, encouraged inventiveness, and did his homework assiduously
when they put proposals before him. He helped create a collegial environment, at least in headquarters. The rejuvenation of
the agency might have happened without him, but it probably was speeded and intensiﬁed because of the way he conducted
himself as commissioner.” Id. at 143.
39Interview with author.
10side of the coin and sympathizes with what Schmidt, as a Republican appointee, endured as Commissioner.
He thinks the political attacks leveled at Schmidt by his Democratic critics—namely, that he and the agency
were too friendly to the pharmaceutical industry—was “unfair targeting” and simply untrue.40
The infusion of politics into the Commissionership is one reason for what Schmidt considered the relatively
high turnover of FDA Commissioners—“crummy continuity,” he called it—from the mid-1960s to the mid-
1980s.41 “With the exception of Charlie [Edwards] and me, you had one- to two-year commissioners since
[George] Larrick,” Schmidt explained. “[M]y prediction is that the current commissioner [Frank Young],
who’s been there only a few months, is going to be taken out of that job within a week or two or three
[to become assistant secretary of health].”42 Such a lack of continuity hinders the FDA’s eﬀectiveness in
carrying out its mission. This hurts the agency itself and, ultimately by extension, the American public.
Frank Young, FDA Commissioner from 1984 to 1989, echoes some of Schmidt’s chief observations in dis-
cussing his own experiences.43 Young considered stability the “linchpin” for the operation of FDA because
it gives the agency “experienced leadership” and “sustained direction.”44 Noting that he became the FDA’s
fourth Commissioner in seven years when he assumed oﬃce, Young recalled: “When I ﬁrst arrived at the
FDA, I felt a bit like a parachutist jumping into unknown territory. I can only imagine how hard it was
for the FDA’s career professionals to have commissioners coming and going like Greyhound buses in the
night.”45
40Id.
41“Interview with Alexander M. Schmidt,” available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/schmidt/part3.html
(created January 17, 2002).
42Id. Frank Young actually served for more than ﬁve years as FDA Commissioner (1984-1989). The accuracy of Schmidt’s
prediction, of course, is less important than his sentiments underlying it.
43As a general matter, the author appreciates Young’s ability to turn a metaphor in describing his experiences.
44Frank E. Young, Strengthening the FDA Through Stability, Modernization, and Statesmanship, 43 Food Drug Cosm. L.J.
447, 448 (1988).
45Id. Upon his departure from FDA, Young’s tenure as Commissioner was the longest since that of George Larrick (1954-1965);
it was then eclipsed by his successor, David Kessler (1990-1997).
11Tied to the notion of stability, in Young’s view, is the statesmanship required of FDA—through “dignity,
vision, and objectivity”—to deal with its various and oft-conﬂicting constituencies.46 But Young pointed
out that statesmanship is a two-way street. While FDA must be willing to accept constructive criticism
from Congress, that criticism should be factually fair and reasonably based. To that end, he has urged, FDA
should ask members of Congress to refrain from “grandstanding” on FDA issues: “Many politicians have
built careers by bashing the bureaucrats. As I have said here before, only eighteen inches separates a pat on
the back from a kick in the behind, but that diﬀerence is profound.”47
To accord it an autonomous identity and to bolster its credibility, Schmidt recommended establishing FDA
as an independent agency by law, with the Commissioner subject to Senate conﬁrmation—auguring the
heart of the 1988 Act: “[T]he commissioner ought to be protected from politics to the extent of that kind of
appointment. I think the agency ought to be left in HHS, but be independently chartered by legislation....
[T]hat would solve an awful lot of problems.”48 Schmidt was not the ﬁrst person to advance this proposal, to
be sure, but the proposal takes on additional weight, given his front-line experiences in the position. Whether
and to what extent the 1988 Act has had the salutary eﬀects forecast by Schmidt remains unclear—and is
a principal focus of this paper.49
Schmidt’s recommendation garnered momentum during the winter of 1985-1986, as eﬀorts in both chambers
of Congress took shape to create FDA oﬃcially by statute and to make the FDA Commissioner subject
to Senate conﬁrmation. In the House of Representatives, Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) led the charge, while
46Id. at 458.
47Young, For Every Thing There is a Season at 10.
48“Interview with Alexander M. Schmidt,” available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/oralhistories/schmidt/part4.html
(created January 17, 2002). Schmidt described how he was part of an earlier unsuccessful eﬀort supporting such legislation:
“Then I forget what happened, but the thing fell apart, and we couldn’t get it through.”
49This will be addressed in greater detail below.
12William Proxmire (D-Wisc.) did so in the Senate.50
Calling his bill “a long overdue measure,” Waxman noted that FDA was the only major federal health and
safety agency whose head was not subject to Presidential appointment and Senate conﬁrmation: “There is
no good reason to exempt the FDA Commissioner from accountability to the Congress.”51 Proxmire argued
that political pressure applied on FDA by the Reagan administration had subverted the agency’s ability
to evaluate the emerging science necessary to ensure and preserve the safety of food, drugs, cosmetics and
devices for the American public. In particular, Proxmire cited the Reagan administration’s revocation of the
FDA Commissioner’s authority to ban cancer-causing color additives; its opposition to complete labeling of
all ingredients used in drugs; and, in the wake of the aspirin-Reyes Syndrome link, its initial pressure on
FDA to make warning labels only voluntary. “[T]he FDA Commissioner can no longer be just another hired
hand of the administration,” Proxmire declared. “We need a tough, independent FDA Commissioner who
can resist powerful political and economic interests.”52 Neither measure made it out of committee, but the
groundwork was laid.
50The House measure was H.R. 3909. The Senate measure was S. 2025 (cosponsored by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)).
Discussion of the substance of the ultimate 1988 Act will begin with the eﬀorts of Waxman and Proxmire, even though, as
noted above, calls for a Senate-conﬁrmed Commissioner had been made in previous years.
51131 Cong. Rec. 36121 (1985). In hearings the next year on his proposed legislation, Waxman mentioned that he thought
the FDA Commissioner post should be subject to conﬁrmation by both the House and the Senate. Senate Conﬁrmation of the
FDA Commissioner; and Reauthorization of Research Activities by ADAMHA: Hearing on H.R. 3909 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986).
52132 Cong. Rec. S 471 (1986).
13IV.
The Food and Drug Administration Act of 1988
During the 1980s, the Reagan administration sought to
deregulate the drug approval process. As a result, in
1981, FDA approved more new drugs than it had in any
single year since 1962.53 Additionally, the deregulation
produced declines in the number of FDA inspections,
product seizures and legal actions.54 Arthur Hull Hayes,
the FDA Commissioner appointed by Secretary of HHS
Richard Schweiker in 1981, was “ideologically consis-
tent” with the priorities of the Reagan administration
and “sought to infuse FDA rulemaking activities with
the regulatory relief priorities of the president.”55 This
philosophical shift in FDA exempliﬁed “the clear re-
sponse of a bureaucracy to a leadership stimulus.”56 The
Reagan administration made two particularly signiﬁcant
changes aﬀecting FDA: It transferred to the HHS Sec-
retary the authority to decide important regulatory is-
sues, and it empowered the Oﬃce of Management and
53B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy 55 (1994).
54Id. at 55-57.
55Id. at 54-55.
56Id. at 57 (noting the uncertainty in “whether the changes in the FDA’s enforcement program were consistent with presidential
preferences or just those of the FDA’s new leadership”).
14Budget (OMB) to review all FDA regulations.57
That an agency or department would set forth to ac-
complish the priorities of the President in oﬃce seems
fairly unremarkable, but this notion assumes a greater
volatility in practice when that agency is FDA. Such was
the case during the 1980s, as many in Washington de-
cried what they viewed as the improper encroachment
of politics into science. For example, FDA scientists had
advocated a ban on the interstate sale of raw milk, and
the agency had sought for some time to require labels
on aspirin bottles warning of Reye’s syndrome, an often-
fatal disease of the brain that can aﬄict children who
use aspirin.58 HHS overruled FDA on banning raw milk
sales and delayed for two years the decision to require
Reye’s syndrome warnings on aspirin labels.59
The volume escalated when consequences of FDA action
or inaction became publicized. Proxmire charged that
the “Commissioners to serve during the Reagan admin-
istration have been kept on increasingly short leashes.”60
The climate even led Schmidt, who had served as Com-
57Specter at A21.
58Specter at A21; Merriam Webster Medical Dictionary, available at http://www.intelihealth.com/cgi-bin/dictionary.cgi?t=9276&st=&p=%7Ebr%2CIHW%7C%7Est%2C408%7C%7Er%2CWSIHW000%7C%7Eb%2C*%7C&MIVAL=ihtIH&WEB HOST=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.intelihealth.com&WEB HOME=%2FIH%2F&hdwd=&book=Medical&jump=reye%27s+syndrome
(visited March 21, 2003).
59Specter at A21.
60132 Cong. Rec. S 470 (1986). The two Commissioners who served during the Reagan administration were Arthur Hull
Hayes (1981-1983) and Frank Young (1984-1989).
15missioner nearly a decade before, to tell state regulators:
“We have more politicization of the agency than is either
warranted by rational politics or good for the American
people.”61 Frank Young, who served for most of Reagan’s
second term, was the last Commissioner not subject to
Presidential appointment and Senate conﬁrmation. Al-
though he recognized that politics is always embedded
within the oﬃce of the FDA Commissioner, he felt “a
strong need for the Commissioner to be as independent
as possible.”62 Noting that there has been a “progressive
politicization” of the FDA Commissioner and the public
health professional in general, Young elaborated:
The Commissioner has to be independent and focus on scientiﬁc issues that are presented to him.
Of course you live in a political environment and are molded by the political climate. But FDA is
too much of a public health agency, so it cannot be a handmaiden of partisan politics. It must rise
to the level of public health—with a capital P and a capital H.63
The 1988 Act was passed in the penultimate year of Young’s tenure in oﬃce and was to be applied to his
successor as Commissioner.
The 1988 Act itself has a relatively sparse legislative history and apparently engendered little debate within
Congress. Waxman once again sponsored the House legislation, H.R. 1226, and Al Gore sponsored the
Senate legislation, S. 223 (with Amendment No. 1401). The language in both chambers echoed that of the
previous eﬀorts, discussed above; the bills, after all, were substantively identical. In fact, the House did not
61Michael L. Millenson, FDA Politicization Called Hazardous to Health, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 20, 1985 (contained in 132
Cong. Rec. S 470 (1986)).
62Interview with author, March 20, 2003.
16hold hearings on the 1988 Act because it had done so on the earlier legislation unsuccessfully introduced by
Waxman.64 In reporting favorably H.R. 1226 to the whole House, the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Report, which totaled only four pages, concluded that “Senate conﬁrmation is a constructive and worthwhile
process...that provides the Congress with an invaluable opportunity for oversight.”65 The report also noted
that the Committee did not receive any “agency views” on the legislation.66
Waxman reiterated his belief that “Senate conﬁrmation is a constructive and worthwhile process,” pointing
out that aside from the FDA Commissioner, the head of every major federal health and safety agency—
including FAA, EPA, OSHA, NHTSA, CPSC and NRC—was subject to Presidential appointment and Senate
conﬁrmation.67 According to the language in the Findings section of the bill, imposing these requirements
would enhance “the independence and integrity” of FDA and its Commissioner.68 In introducing the Senate
version of the bill, Gore sharply criticized the Reagan administration for “launch[ing] a quiet assault” on
FDA.69 Citing the Reye’s syndrome issue, he claimed that “special interests and partisan politics have
replaced sound scientiﬁc policy”—resulting in “[m]orale among FDA professionals...at an all-time low.”70
These rationales did not go unchallenged by some academics. “The legislators do not provide justiﬁcation for
this change based on any neutral principles of good government,” wrote one professor at the time. “Indeed,
all the reasons presented in the legislative history are political ones.... Politics matter, and structure is a
weapon in the battle.”71
64The pertinent aspects of those hearings on the earlier legislation, H.R. 3909, will be discussed below.
65H.R. Rep. No. 70, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1987).
66Id. at 4.
67133 Cong. Rec. 4044-45 (1987).
68134 Cong. Rec. 18888 (1988).
69133 Cong. Rec. 660 (1987).
70Id.
71Susan Bartlett Foote, Independent Agencies Under Attack: A Skeptical View of the Importance of the Debate, 1988 Duke
L.J. 223, 230, 232 (1988). Foote rejected the justiﬁcation of placing FDA in line with the other major federal health and safety
agencies: “These agencies were formed in the 1960s and 1970s, when a powerful Congress won greater agency autonomy from
the executive branch.... The FDA, by contrast, has its roots in the Progressive era, and its ties to the executive branch are
due to historical accident, not inequitable treatment.” Id. at 230-31.
17Although passage of the 1988 Act originated with Democratic lawmakers in both chambers, there does not
appear from the legislative record to have been much, if any, opposition from their Republican counterparts.
Moreover, there is little evidence of any vehement opposition from the Reagan administration.72 Waxman
had anticipated vocal resistance from the White House; Gore, testifying at the hearings on Waxman’s initial
legislation, urged that the expected opposition be “heavily discount[ed]...as merely a knee-jerk reaction.”73
But any tension between the executive and legislative branches over the legislation was not evident from the
hearings.74 In fact, the Reagan administration’s spokesman at the hearings, Donald Ian MacDonald, acting
assistant secretary for health in HHS, was mild and measured in objecting to the legislation: “[W]hile we
recognize the signiﬁcance of the mission of FDA and consequently the importance of its Commissioner, we
do not believe this change in the current appointment procedure for the Commissioner is necessary.... We
do not see it as a necessary change, but would not struggle to disagree with you.”75
And so the legislation passed with more of a proverbial whimper than a bang. What remained to be seen
among interested participants and observers was whether the 1988 Act would more insulate from or infect
with politics the position of FDA Commissioner.
V.
Aftermath of the 1988 Act
Upon passage of the 1988 Act, Gore predicted that requiring Presidential appointment and Senate conﬁrma-
tion of the FDA Commissioner would be an invaluable improvement: “In the past, the current arrangement
72Interestingly, passage of the 1988 Act did not occasion much reaction from former FDA Commissioners. As Donald Kennedy
recalled: “It made only a ripple, in my memory. I think I said, ‘That’s interesting,’ but it was not a big event.” Interview with
author.
73Hearing on H.R. 3909 at 6.
74Despite extensive research, the author was unable to ﬁnd any evidence of substantial opposition of the White House to the
1988 Act.
75Hearing on H.R. 3909 at 29-30.
18has resulted in serious delays in decisionmaking—delays that have endangered the public health and cost
industry millions of dollars. I think we will all beneﬁt from an independent and accountable FDA.”76 Fifteen
years later, the irony in Gore’s statement is glaring: Delays in ﬁlling the post of FDA Commissioner since
the 1988 Act have been markedly greater than prior to it. Between 1940 and 1988, the average length of time
for ﬁlling the post was 21
2 months.77 Since 1988, however, the average length of time to ﬁll the position for
three Commissioners has been nearly 11
2 years (17 months).78 FDA simply cannot be expected to operate
at its optimal eﬀectiveness without a permanent leader at the helm for such long periods.
Advocates of the 1988 Act tend to characterize the delays more as a result of necessary contemplative
deliberation, rather than the product of political wrangling over an acceptable nominee or of the larger
political climate. As Gore put it: “The Senate is by nature a patient institution, not to mention one that
demands patience. Senators have shown that they are willing to take the time to make the review process
valuable and productive.”79 Jane Henney, who served as FDA Commissioner from 1998 to early 2001 and
was thus subject to Senate conﬁrmation, considers at least some delay necessary given the signiﬁcance of
FDA’s responsibilities. “The agency is so important at the end of the day to the American public, so the
administration should wait it out until it gets the right person,” she said. “The lagtime that has been created
has been due to a lack of appreciation over kind of person needed to do that job.”80 According to Henney,
every candidate for Commissioner should possess three basic criteria “before their name gets to the trial
balloon stage:” (1) a substantive scientiﬁc or medical background to understand the public health issues;
76134 Cong. Rec. S725-02 (1988).
77Walter Campbell was appointed as the ﬁrst FDA Commissioner, by that name, in 1940. “Milestones in U.S. Food and
Drug Law History,” on FDA website, available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html (last updated on
August 5, 2002).
78The experiences of the three FDA Commissioners since the 1988 Act—David Kessler, Jane Henney and Mark McClellan—
will be discussed below.
79Hearing on H.R. 3909 at 6.
80Interview with author, March 21, 2003.
19(2) senior managerial experience, because they will be running a very complex organization in FDA; and (3)
not be from regulated industry because of the FDA’s fundamental interest in consumer protection.81
The line between thoughtful deliberation and partisan political delay, however, is a thin one and can only
be stretched so far. When Henney became Commissioner 21 months after the departure of her predecessor,
David Kessler, she recognized that “some of the delay was noticeable—people were clearly waiting for the
Commissioner to come on board.”82 Henney had an institutional advantage of having served as Deputy
Commissioner for Operations at FDA from 1992 to 1994, so she knew how the agency operated. “I was
coming back to my own team,” she explained, noting that she had recruited much of the personnel and
had helped organize the centers. “So from day one, I could step in and be Commissioner.”83 But Henney
acknowledged that most incoming Commissioners do not have the beneﬁt of having worked previously at
FDA; she estimates that ordinarily it would take six months to a year to become fully comfortable in the
job.84
Delays in Presidential nomination or Senate conﬁrmation only compound this adjustment period—thus,
debilitating the Commissioner from the outset and hampering eﬀective operation of FDA even further.
Consider the critique of Michael Friedman, who served as lead Deputy Commissioner of FDA for the nearly






20[A]lthough this change was meant to elevate the proﬁle of the oﬃce, it probably has materially
contributed to the delays in ﬁlling the post. Not only has the commissioner’s selection become the
arena for ideological contests, it only takes an objection from one senator to paralyze the selection
process. Over the past 5 years, a permanent, conﬁrmed commissioner has been in charge only about
one-third of the time. Consistent agency leadership cannot exist in such a fractured environment.
The fact that many good, positive actions were taken during that period in no way makes up for
the other opportunities lost.85
After enduring the delays and political struggles to install an FDA Commissioner, the question naturally
shifts to whether doing so is worthwhile—that is, whether the FDA Commissioner, the agency and the public
at large enjoy any beneﬁts from the 1988 Act.
Henney believes going “through the ﬁre of a Senate conﬁrmation,” as she did, enhances the prestige of the
Commissionership.86 “There is a certain amount of respect and stature when you are Senate conﬁrmed,”
she explained. “They have placed their mark of approval on your presence in government. It is a mark
of merit and stature within government and internationally, because you are seen as a senior part of the
administration.”87
FDA Commissioners who served prior to 1988, however, are less conﬁdent that the beneﬁts of Senate con-
ﬁrmation are so concrete. Although Edwards thinks Senate conﬁrmation is important on paper because
it adds stature to the position—and anything done to enhance stature is good—he does not believe it has
made much diﬀerence as a practical matter. “Senate conﬁrmation is not the ingredient that makes for suc-
cess or failure,” Edwards said.88 Of paramount importance, according to Edwards, is “the personality of
the individual Commissioner and whether or not people respect you—regardless of who conﬁrmed you.”89




89Id. In hindsight, Edwards admits: “If I had my druthers, I wish I had been conﬁrmed by the Senate.” He remembers talking
about it with the White House and HHS, but in the end, it was not of “earth-shaking” importance and “made no practical
diﬀerence in the way we ran FDA.”
21of political ﬁg-leaf for the Commissioner.”90 Kennedy recalls that during his tenure as Commissioner, there
was some talk about why the FDA Commissioner—as such a visible and inﬂuential regulatory position—was
Executive Level 5, instead of Level 3 or 4.91 However, Kennedy never considered that a particularly pow-
erful argument because, to him, rank never really mattered much: “More important was how much leeway
the Commissioner had within the agency. Congress and the media, or anyone, didn’t pay any attention
to whether or not the Commissioner was appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.”92 Indeed,
Kennedy believes he had more authority in HEW with respect to regulation than did his successors after
the 1988 Act, which he thinks has given the White House greater control over the Commissioner.93
Frank Young, the last Commissioner not subject to Senate conﬁrmation, concurs with Kennedy. “Senatorial
conﬁrmation pins a Commissioner’s hands down— that is part of the point,” Young observed. “That can be
a destructive event.”94 Subjecting an FDA Commissioner nominee to Presidential appointment and Senate
conﬁrmation inherently politicizes the position; the injection of the two political branches into the process
makes it inevitable. But this mechanism raises the issue of to what extent the politicization will permeate
FDA itself. For Young, a serious diﬃculty of having a senatorially conﬁrmed position is that “not only does
it politicize the oﬃce of Commissioner, but it also politicizes one level down from the Commissioner to the
Deputy Commissioners.”95
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94Interview with author.
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22by the Senate, Henney sought to prevent the politics from “brush[ing] down through the rest of the agency.”96
Not surprisingly, she said, this produced great tension with the White House personnel oﬃce, which desired
a strong presence of political appointees in FDA. With the backing of HHS Secretary Donna Shalala, Henney
reduced the number of political appointees in FDA (aside from the Commissioner) from 17 to one, ﬁlling
the positions with career appointees instead.97 “FDA needed to be seen as a nonpolitical agency,” she
said. “There were some very important signals I wanted to send: I would be leading policy and making
enforcement decisions based on science, not on political whims.”98
Since the 1988 Act, however, politics has gripped the FDA Commissioner—particularly as viewed through
the appointment and conﬁrmation process—with ever-greater force. The experiences of the three FDA
Commissioners who have been subject to the 1988 Act oﬀer poignant illustrations of this politicization.
VI.
Post-1988 Act FDA Commissioners
David Kessler (1990-1997)
David Kessler, appointed by the ﬁrst President Bush as FDA Commissioner in 1990, was the ﬁrst head of
the agency subject to Senate conﬁrmation. Any anticipation about operation of the 1988 Act was quickly
rendered anticlimactic: Kessler was conﬁrmed on the basis of written answers to 13 written questions by
Senators Kennedy and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) without a public hearing.99 There were no live hearings because
96Interview with author.
97Id. Upon Henney’s insistence, the one remaining political appointee would have neither a policy position nor a line man-
agement position. But Henney noted: “Under the new Commissioner [Mark McClellan], this has all changed.”
98Id.
99136 Cong. Rec. 36391 (1990); Hutt, Investigations and Reports at 49.
23consideration of Kessler’s appointment occurred at the end of the legislative session; the Senate was anxious
to conﬁrm him—the Commissionership had been vacant for nearly a year by that time—and thus expedited
his nomination.
At the “conﬁrmation hearing,” Gore remarked upon the “truly historic step” of the Senate conﬁrming an
FDA Commissioner, proud of the oversight and accountability that “we fought so hard for when we enacted
the Food and Drug Administration Act 2 years ago.”100 Thus, Gore was more than a bit miﬀed, and perhaps
embarrassed, that the Senate would have to settle for written questions and answers upon which to conﬁrm
Kessler. He placed the blame “squarely” on the Bush administration, whom he accused of playing politics
with Kessler’s nomination: “[T]he administration...has left this important agency without a Commissioner
since November last year [1989], which has known for months who the nominee would be, but waited until
the last possible moment to nominate him, which knew that this would be the ﬁrst time a prospective Com-
missioner would come before the Senate, but didn’t seem to care.”101 The degree of truth, if any, to Gore’s
charges is unclear. The paradox, however, is not: Although one of Congress’ chief aims in the 1988 Act was
to excise partisan politics from the selection of the FDA Commissioner, they were on conspicuous display
here—even before “consideration” of Kessler’s nomination.
Kessler himself received high praise from the three Senators who spoke in the Congressional Record for
his nomination: Kennedy, Hatch and Gore. Hatch captured the general sentiments of the trio when he
expressed conﬁdence that Kessler would exhibit “competent and strong leadership” as FDA Commissioner
and bolster public conﬁdence in the agency: “I have known Dr. Kessler for many years, and his reputation,
experience, and dedication to public service make him the right choice for FDA.”102 Kessler submitted an-
swers to written questions on a range of issues, from FDA’s enforcement mechanisms to its food protection
100136 Cong. Rec. 36389 (1990).
101136 Cong. Rec. 36390 (1990).
102Id.
24program to biotechnology to its funding and to its supposed need for “revitalization.” On this last issue,
Kessler answered: “Revitalization is crucial if we are to restore the agency’s credibility and stature, and
strengthen the morale of agency employees.”103 He then set forth what he considered the steps necessary
for revitalization—an indication of the forceful tone he would set as FDA Commissioner: “enhancing the
authority and accountability of leadership at all levels; improving decisionmaking by ensuring that actions
taken by the agency have a sound scientiﬁc basis; and using the appropriate management tools to guide the
agency’s activities and allow it to function more eﬀectively.”104
As Commissioner, Kessler’s audacity (or pugnacity, depending on one’s point of view) ruﬄed more than a
few feathers. Kessler sought FDA authority to regulate tobacco products, on the ground that nicotine is
a drug—perhaps “the most ambitious public health initiative in the history” of the agency.105 He led the
tobacco initiative and ran it “out of a makeshift ‘war room’ in his oﬃce.”106 The Supreme Court ultimately
held, after Kessler left oﬃce, that FDA lacked authority in the FD&C Act to regulate tobacco products.107
Trained as both a lawyer and a doctor, Kessler, now dean of the Yale Medical School, steeled himself for
the adversarial nature of his tenure in oﬃce. He explained his approach as FDA Commissioner this way:
“In general, you wake up in the morning, you decide what you think is right, what is consistent with the
policies of the administration, and you go about your job, usually with no one telling you what to do, and
only hearing if you’re wrong, that you shouldn’t have gone in that direction.”108 His supporters admired
his courage in taking on the tobacco industry—“an American Goliath,” as Kessler called it109—while his
critics denounced his arrogance in overstepping the bounds of his oﬃce. As Donald Kennedy, one of Kessler’s
predecessors, commented: “If I [liked political struggles] to a degree, then David Kessler is double that. He
103136 Cong. Rec. 36392 (1990).
104Id.
105Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Overloaded FDA Is Facing Biggest Challenge, Tobacco, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1997.
106Id.
107Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
108Interview, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, March 12, 2002.
109Stolberg, Overloaded FDA.
25really made smoking an issue, when he didn’t have to; he could have ducked it altogether.”110
Upon reﬂection, Kessler said he valued his time as FDA Commissioner and “wouldn’t have traded it for
anything,” despite “the white heat [and] the intensity” of the job.111 Although Kessler acknowledged the
diﬃculty of ﬁnding the right person to lead FDA, given the qualiﬁcations needed and tremendous respon-
sibilities of the job, maintaining a permanent FDA Commissioner is crucial for the agency to achieve its
goals.112 “There’s no way that you can take on the real tough issues without having permanent leadership,”
he explained. “A permanent director’s job is to put their body in between that whole outside world, all
that political pounding, and the people at the agency who do their work. A permanent FDA commissioner
needs to take that pounding and absorb it and protect the rank and ﬁle.”113 Permanency, however, is one
feature decidedly not promoted by the 1988 Act—indeed, as discussed above, the average delay in ﬁlling the
Commissionership since making it subject to Senate conﬁrmation has been 17 months.
Jane Henney (1998-2001)
Responsibility for such delay rests not only with Congress,
but with the White House as well. Although Kessler
left oﬃce in early 1997, President Clinton did not sub-
mit Jane Henney’s nomination to the Senate until June
110Interview with author. Kennedy told the New York Times that FDA “is the perfect example of the kind of agency that
a politician doesn’t want to be seen on the street with.” Stolberg, Overloaded FDA. Kennedy’s comment is interesting, given
that FDA ranks high in public opinion polls, as discussed above.
111NPR Interview. Kessler added that his six-and-a-half year tenure as Commissioner “almost seemed like a lifetime.”
112Commenting on the Commissionership vacancy, ultimately ﬁlled last October with Mark McClellan (see below), Kessler laid
out an array of desired qualiﬁcations: “You’d probably want an MD, you want someone who knows food and drug regulation,
who could manage a large agency of 10,000 people, who has Washington experience, who has a backbone of steel, who’s
acceptable to a Republican administration, who can be conﬁrmed by a Democratic Senate, who’s willing to accept a low salary
with political uncertainty, willing to relocate and be subject to all the conﬂict-of-interest rules.” NPR Interview.
113Id.
261998.114 Henney, the ﬁrst and only female FDA Com-
missioner, recognized from the outset that, as successor
to the confrontational Kessler, she would have to tread
gingerly on the political mineﬁeld. She prepared to face
a Republican-controlled Senate that was no admirer of
her predecessor and that was soon preparing to hold the
impeachment trial of the President who nominated her.
Although she was the ﬁrst FDA Commissioner nominee who faced full Senate conﬁrmation hearings, Henney
was not sure she would even make it to that point. “At the time, the Republicans had vowed that no other
Clinton appointee would be approved—that was right out of the box,” she recalled. “Everybody was bleak
that the conﬁrmation would go through. The Clinton administration...told me this might go on a long
time.”115 Henney knew she “wasn’t a political chip” because all of her previous government experience had
been in career service—she had served in the FDA under Kessler (1992-94) and for nearly a decade before
that at the National Cancer Institute.116 “So when people on the Senate side and in the Administration
said it was nothing personal,” Henney said, “it never felt personal.”117
As the process inched forward, Henney sought to ease the hostility that still lingered in Congress over Kessler’s
114One professor of food and drug law sharply rebuked the White House for the delay: “Is the Clinton administration trying
to tell us it doesn’t care about the FDA?...You would have expected that the administration would have made every eﬀort to
ﬁll the job right away. Instead it acted positively bashful after suﬀering its ﬁll of bashes while Kessler was commissioner....
Tired of squabbling with a Republican-controlled Congress over various decisions by Kessler’s FDA, the Clinton administration
may have decided to lower the agency’s proﬁle for a while, to keep Congress from squawking.” Eric F. Greenberg, New FDA




27tobacco regulation eﬀort and the ongoing debate over whether FDA should approve RU-486 (mifepristone),
a controversial French abortion drug.118 At the hearing on her nomination, Henney pledged to work closely
with Congress: “I am deeply committed to building bridges of communication and breaking down the barriers
that have kept the Agency from being as eﬀective and productive as it should be.”119
Behind the scenes, Henney was conducting courtesy visits to members of the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee, which was to determine whether to recommend her nomination to the full Senate for
conﬁrmation. “It was kind of a thing where you had to win them one by one,” she said. “You really had to
ﬁnd out where people were coming from and how to address them, and without losing your principles—both
from a public health point of view and personally, ethically.”120 Henney tells the story of one particular
courtesy visit to a Senator on the Committee to illustrate this delicate but necessary task:
118FDA ultimately approved RU-486 in September 2000, when Henney was Commissioner.
1199/2/98 Cong. Testimony (Pg. Unavail. Online), 1998 WL 18088268.
120Interview with author.
28In his oﬃce, I noticed a ﬂy-ﬁshing rod and reel on the wall. I knew
his issue was going to be RU-486 and it would be testy. When he
came out, I told him that I liked to ﬂy-ﬁsh, also. We chatted about
that for a while. Then he said, “You know what I have to ask
you tomorrow?” I said, “Yes.” He said, “And you’ll answer me
forthrightly?” I said, “Yes.” He said, “O.K., see you tomorrow.”
That was our meeting. When I greeted him the next day, I said,
“Just remember, Senator: This is catch-and-release.” That is a
ﬂy-ﬁshing term that means you can hook me, but you’ve got to let
me go (out of this Committee).121
The Committee eventually recommended Henney’s nomination by voice vote, but it encountered a roadblock
of opposition, over the tobacco and RU-486 issues, erected by several Republicans, led by Don Nickles (R-
Okla.), the majority whip; Nickels placed a hold on the nomination.122
Nickles charged that under Kessler’s “regime, particularly during the Clinton Administration,” partisanship
in FDA obstructed it from performing its essential functions: “[T]he FDA was involved in a lot of political
activity. Under the leadership of David Kessler, the Agency too often became a tool of the Administration
to push its liberal political agenda. One area where this was particularly oﬀensive was the FDA’s attempt
to regulate tobacco.”123 Indeed, the ring in Nickles’ charges echoed quite closely that of the congressional
Democrats who led the passage of the 1988 Act a decade earlier. The symmetrical politicization of FDA had
come full circle. Nickles lifted his hold on the nomination after Henney promised that, as Commissioner,
she would not solicit an American manufacturer for RU-486 nor actively facilitate ﬁnal approval of the
121Id.
122Eric Schmitt, Nomination for FDA Post Nears Approval in Senate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1998.
123144 Cong. Rec. S12689 (1998). During Henney’s conﬁrmation process, the Fourth Circuit had reversed the federal district
court’s ruling that had recognized FDA authority to regulate tobacco. In 2000, as noted above, the Supreme Court aﬃrmed
5-4 the Fourth Circuit’s decision rejecting FDA regulatory authority over tobacco.
29drug.124 Nickles then supported Henney’s nomination, declaring: “I am conﬁdent that she will be a very
able administrator who will not play politics. In my opinion, she doesn’t have a political agenda.”125 After
extensive conﬁrmation hearings—six hours long and 100 questions, Henney remembers—the Senate approved
her nomination; she became FDA Commissioner in November 1998.126
Henney’s tenure as Commissioner lasted a little more than two years, until the second President Bush took
oﬃce in January 2001. Partisan politics served as bookends to Henney’s term as head of FDA. Henney had
hoped that, like her predecessor Kessler, she would be asked to remain in oﬃce by the incoming President
of a diﬀerent party—at least for the short term—but that was not the case; Bush accepted her letter of
resignation, which she had ﬁled as a routine matter in December 2000, a few days before his inauguration.127
Congressmen from both parties had tried to convince the Bush White House to retain Henney, but to no
avail.128 As a veteran of Washington, however, Henney was prepared for the repercussions of the change of
guard:
I was mature enough to know what the process was. It was bittersweet in that I loved my job at
FDA and every minute I spent there. I knew that part of the job is that you are vulnerable to
the wishes of the party in power and they can ask you to leave at any time. It’s one of those “It’s
nothing personal” things. It was like I had done this before—hard to get in and diﬃcult to leave.129
The decision to replace Henney was widely expected. As Commissioner, Henney authorized FDA approval
of RU-486, a controversial decision that all but sealed her fate. The juxtaposition in Washington was telling:
On the day Tommy Thompson, Bush’s choice for HHS Secretary, testiﬁed at his conﬁrmation hearings that
124144 Cong. Rec. S12691 (1998); Schmitt, Nomination for FDA Post Nears Approval in Senate; Lars Noah, A Miscarriage
in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 571, 583 (2001).
125144 Cong. Rec. S12690 (1998).
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question-and-answer period as part of this session, which I declined. Since the Senate provided me the opportunity to answer
so many questions during the conﬁrmation process, I was not sure I had any new answers left.” Remarks of the Commissioner
of Food and Drugs, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 1 (1999).
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30he would review FDA’s approval of RU-486, Henney was clearing out her desk at FDA—having received
word the previous evening that she would not be retained and that she should be out of her oﬃce within 24
hours.130
Mark McClellan (2001-present)
The Commissionership remained vacant for 21 months between Henney’s departure and Senate conﬁrmation
of Mark McClellan in October 2002, the same amount of delay between Kessler and Henney. The nomination
and conﬁrmation process of McClellan oﬀers a particularly colorful, and arguably disturbing, glimpse of the
entrenchment of politics into the position of FDA Commissioner.
Opening salvos were lobbed across the editorial pages of the New York Times. Three months after Bush
took oﬃce, William Schultz, FDA Deputy Commissioner for Policy during the Clinton administration (1994-
1999), contended that Thompson’s decision to review approval of RU-486 was preventing the installation of
a permanent FDA Commissioner. “The reason for the holdup at the FDA appears to be abortion politics,”
he wrote. “It is time for the administration to bite the bullet, announce that the nation will abide by the
decision already made on RU-486, and get on with the business of nominating a commissioner of the Food
and Drug Administration.”131 In response, Henry Miller, an FDA oﬃcial from 1979 to 1994, rejected the
charge of abortion politics. “Even in the best of times, it is a diﬃcult job to ﬁll,” wrote Miller, citing the
thorny issues facing the Commissioner, the relatively low salary and the small number of political appointees
at the agency. “The position should not be awarded as a political plum, and politics should be banished
from the eventual incumbent’s decisionmaking, insofar as that is possible.”132
The path that led to McClellan’s eventual nomination assumed, at times, a circus-like appearance. In a highly
130Weiss at A8.
131William B. Schultz, The Leaderless FDA, N.Y. Times, April 17, 2001.
132Henry I. Miller, At the Helm of the FDA, N.Y. Times, April 21, 2001. Miller acknowledged in his letter to the editor that
he “was asked but declined to be considered for the job.”
31unusual move, Secretary Thompson privately circulated the name of his choice to ﬁll the Commissionership,
Lester Crawford, and suggested in public remarks that the appointment was a foregone conclusion: “And
so all we have to do is get the president to announce it and have the FBI do the background check. And
we’re conﬁdent we’ll get it done as quickly as we possibly can.”133 Apparently, Thompson presumed to have
White House support for Crawford where he did not; Crawford was eventually named Deputy Commissioner
for FDA in February 2002.134
Thompson’s premature announcement highlighted a Commissioner search in which Senate Democrats re-
jected a White House candidate, Michael Astrue, general counsel for a biotechnology company in Cambridge,
Mass., because of his ties to the pharmaceutical industry, which is regulated by FDA.135 On the ﬂip side,
a top White House oﬃcial—thought to be Karl Rove, Bush’s chief political adviser—vetoed the potential
nomination of Alistair J.J. Wood, a drug-safety expert at Vanderbilt University, because Wood was consid-
ered an overly aggressive regulator.136 “The president is getting squeezed from all sides,” observed David
Kessler at the time. “The job of the agency is to protect public health, and it needs leadership.”137 By July
2002, a year-and-a-half after Henney left oﬃce, the FDA Commissioner was the highest-ranking federal post
still vacant.138
In the fall of 2002, Bush formally announced McClellan as his choice to head FDA. Although McClellan
had impressive credentials as a physician and economist, with experience in both the Clinton White House
(as deputy assistant secretary of the treasury for economic policy) and the second Bush White House (as
the top adviser on healthcare issues), he had not worked extensively in regulatory aﬀairs nor managed a
staﬀ the size of FDA (more than 10,000 employees).139 At his conﬁrmation hearings, McClellan reiterated
133Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Health Secretary Promotes FDA Choice, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 2001.
134Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Deputy Is Appointed to Direct Food and Drug Agency as Impasse Continues, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
2002.
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136Marc Kaufman, FDA Commissioner’s Position Remains Empty, Washington Post, July 15, 2002, at A15.
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139Marc Kaufman, Bush Adviser Tabbed for FDA Post, Washington Post, Sept. 25, 2002, at A25.
32the promise of many of his predecessors to keep an open mind and ear and to work amicably with Capital
Hill: “Transparency and responsiveness start with the interactions between the Commissioner’s oﬃce and
Congress.... [I will] ensur[e] that sound science, careful empirical analysis, and ethical integrity are the
foundation for FDA’s decisions.”140
McClellan’s conﬁrmation process was uneventful, perhaps too much so.141 The Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions Committee unanimously recommended McClellan’s nomination to the full Senate, but only
three Senators were present for the initial phase of McClellan’s questioning.142 Such sparse attendance
seemed to make a mockery of the 1988 Act and suggested that it is functionally toothless. At the very least,
it is diﬃcult to reconcile with the gravity behind Gore’s support for that eventual legislation in his 1986
testimony: “[T]he Senate deserves an opportunity to review the nomination of an individual so critical to
the public health.”143 The full Senate unanimously conﬁrmed McClellan as FDA Commissioner by voice
vote in October 2002, before its adjournment.144
VII.
Conclusion
FDA is of profound and unquestionable importance in Washington and to the American public, with its $1.6
billion annual budget and responsibility for 80 percent of the country’s food and all medical products.145 In
requiring Senate conﬁrmation of the FDA Commissioner, Congress in part sought to elevate the status of the
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33post to correspond to that importance. Whether the enhanced prestige of the Commissionership, through
the 1988 Act, has produced any real changes rests in the eye of the beholder—or the holder of oﬃce; after
all, as discussed above, Henney appreciated the stature that accompanied the requirement, while some of
her predecessors discounted its tangible eﬀects. Interestingly, both Henney and Young would prefer to have
the FDA Commissioner be appointed to a six-year term with Senate conﬁrmation; there would then be an
option for the Commissioner to be reappointed for another six-year term.146 The two former Commissioners
believe this procedure would promote bipartisanship and longevity in the post.147
Michael Friedman has suggested even eliminating the Senate conﬁrmation requirement altogether. “Neither
congressional oversight nor Executive Oﬃce expectations,” he argued, “would be diminished by returning the
commissioner’s job to a high visibility presidential appointment.”148 Of course, stripping the Commission-
ership of its Senate conﬁrmation requirement would be unthinkable in Washington and, in practical terms,
highly unlikely.
When Gore testiﬁed at congressional hearings about the legislation that eventually became the 1988 Act,
he was asked if requiring Senate conﬁrmation would adversely impact the independence of the FDA Com-
missioner. He responded: “I do not think so. Indeed, I think it would enhance that person’s independence,
because instead of being subject to the whim of an immediate superior, he would have the extra insulation
aﬀorded by this new role played by a second branch of Government.”149 With the Senate layered on top of
the FDA Commissioner as “extra insulation,” as it has been for the past 15 years, the Commissioner must
be ever-mindful of the fragile line between protection and suﬀocation. And even then, regardless of form,
politicization of FDA springs eternal.
146Interviews with author. The reappointment would not require another Senate conﬁrmation.
147Id.
148Friedman at 2332.
149Hearing on H.R. 3909.
34